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Board Gender Diversity and Corporate Response to Sustainability Initiatives: Evidence
from the Carbon Disclosure Project

Abstract

This paper investigates the effect of female representation on the board of directors on corporate
response to stakeholders’ demands for increased public reporting about climate change related
risks. We rely on the Carbon Disclosure Project (CDP) as a sustainability initiative supported by
institutional investors. Greenhouse Gas (GHG) emissions measurement and its disclosure to
investors can be thought of as a first step towards addressing climate change issues and reducing
the firm’s carbon footprint.
Based on a sample of publicly listed Canadian firms over the period 2008-2014, we find that the
likelihood of voluntary climate change disclosure increases with women percentage on boards. We
also find evidence that supports critical mass theory with regard to board gender diversity. These
findings reinforce initiatives being undertaken around the world to promote gender diversity in
corporate governance while demonstrating board effectiveness in stakeholder management.

Keywords: Sustainability Disclosure, Climate change, Greenhouse Gas Emissions, Gender
Diversity, Corporate Governance, Board of Directors.
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1. Introduction
This paper investigates the relationship between female representation on boards and the voluntary
disclosure of climate change information, two major social and environmental issues that are
transforming the corporate competitive landscape. Morality and ethics are central to these two
issues and the demand to integrate environmental and social considerations into corporate values
is being driven by shareholders, customers, employees and other stakeholders.

The main issue we address is whether female representation on the board of directors impacts the
firm’s decision to voluntarily respond to major stakeholders’ demands for increased public
reporting about greenhouse gas (GHG) emission levels and climate change related risks? Prior
research has mainly focused on the gender diversity – financial performance relationship and much
less is known about the channels through which female participation on the board affects firm
performance. To better understand this relation, recent studies have explored the link between
female directors and the adoption of corporate social responsibility (CSR) practices (Bear et al,
2010; Seto-Pamies, 2013; Zhang et al., 2013). Two recent studies directly related to ours are PradoLorenzo & Garcia-Sanchez (2010) and Liao, Luo & Tang (2014) where the particular emphasis
was on the relation between gender diversity and GHG emission level disclosures. Prado-Lorenzo
& Garcia-Sanchez (2010) find no relation although Liao et al (2014) show female representation
to positively influence carbon disclosures in the UK. We attempt to resolve these conflicting
findings using a sample of Canadian firms from 2008 to 2014, by first identifying the critical mass
of female directors required to effect disclosure and also by controlling for endogeneity from selfselection bias (Adams & Ferreira, 2009). These enhancements are predicted to elucidate the gender
diversity-CSR disclosure relation in a global climate of increased female representation on boards.
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Equal opportunity in the workplace is a basic human right. But is this opportunity afforded to
females who wish to be part of the ‘apex of the decision-making process’ (Kassinis & Vafeas,
2002) the corporate board? The ‘old boys’ network’ attitude should not prevail when nominations
are sought for board appointment yet, the percentage of female directors on Canadian boards
suggests otherwise, compared to international standards. The methodical exclusion of a portion of
society, because of gender and not talent, results in sub-optimal boards, (Carver, 2002; Cassell,
2000). The issue of female representation on boards for improvement in decision making due to
their ethical behavior in the workplace remains unresolved. The Lehman Sisters hypothesis has
been put forward, arguing that the banking crisis would not have occurred if there had been more
women at the top (van Staveren, 2014), while others show no difference in ethical behavior
between males and females (Hegarty and Sims, 1978; 1979)

The board of directors has two different roles, one of monitoring (control role) of managers and
the second is to provide resources (service role). With regards to the former, the separation of
ownership and control (Berle & Means, 1932) with the resultant potential for conflict of interests
means the board is responsible for monitoring managers on the behalf of shareholders. This first
role has been analyzed through agency theory (Jensen & Meckling 1976; Fama & Jensen 1983).
The latter role is to provide resources (service role) and this service role has been analyzed through
the research streams of resource dependence theory (RDT) (Pfeffer 1972; Pfeffer & Salanick 1978;
Hillman et al 2000) and stakeholder theory (Johnson & Greening 1999; Luoma & Goodstein 1999;
Hillman & Keim 2001; Huse 2003). We utilize RDT in exploring the relationship between female
representation on boards and the voluntary disclosure of climate change information.
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Females bring different characteristics to boards where they are perceived to have a more
participative, democratic and communal leadership style (Eagly et al., 2003; Eagly & Johnson,
1990; Rudman & Glick, 2001). This may lead to improved board effectiveness as a result of the
improved quality of board deliberations and better supervision of the firm’s disclosures (Gul et al
2011).
Nielsen & Huse (2010, page 138) suggest that “women may be particularly sensitive to – and may
exercise influence on – decisions pertaining to certain organizational practices, such as corporate
social responsibility and environmental politics.” With regard to the latter, the demand for
increased climate change disclosure is a global phenomenon1 driven by interested stakeholders
seeking to assess a firm’s environmental impact and the associated risks (Stanny & Ely, 2008).
Recent academic research suggests that information intermediaries in the capital markets
incorporate environmental, social and governance data in their valuation models (Ioannou and
Serafeim, 2010; Eccles et al., 2011). However these stakeholders; employees, customers, analysts
and institutional shareholders find it difficult to assess the above given the lack of comparability
and consistency on environmental reporting across firms.

The Carbon Disclosure Project (CDP), a not-for-profit organization that has the backing of 767
financial institutions controlling assets of $92 trillion in 2014, seeks to remedy this deficiency by
employing a standard questionnaire in requesting this information directly from firms. Since 2003,
the CDP has requested annually the largest companies (top 200 companies in Canada) from

1

In June 2012, The United Kingdom (UK) government announced that, starting from April 2013, all companies listed
on the main market of the London Stock Exchange will be required to disclose their GHG emission levels in the annual
reports. In February 2010, The United States (US) Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) issued an interpretive
guidance on climate change related risks to help US firms comply with their disclosure obligations.
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different countries across the globe to respond to the same set of questions and disclose their
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, climate changes risks and opportunities and strategies to address
them (Kolk et al., 2008). Recent studies provide evidence that voluntary disclosure of GHG
emission levels to the CDP are value relevant for investors (Griffin et al. 2010; Matsumura et al.,
2014). It is the board’s responsibility to ensure that material environmental risks are well
monitored and fully disclosed to investors and thus we relate female board participation (board
gender diversity) to the firm’s decision to voluntarily respond to the CDP annual questionnaire.

We examine the relationship between female representation on the board and the propensity to
provide climate change disclosures for a sample of 541 firm year observations listed on the Toronto
Stock Exchange (TSX) over the period 2008-2014. Board gender diversity is measured through
the percentage of women directors on the board and the Blau (1977) index of heterogeneity.
Female participation in the boardroom increases the likelihood of voluntary disclosure of climate
change related risks in the CDP. We find also that female board participation needs to reach a
critical mass of three before it starts influencing disclosures about climate change strategies. Our
results are robust to potential endogeneity issues.

This paper makes several contributions to the extant literature on board diversity and
environmental reporting. First, we assess the relationship between female representation on boards
and the firm’s decision to voluntarily disclose climate change information, the related risks and
opportunities that has been requested specifically by a major stakeholder (i.e. institutional
investors). Since institutional investors are actively seeking change on board diversity and climate
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change disclosure, we add to the existing CSR literature by exploring how board gender diversity
may shape corporate response to institutional investors’ demands for increased public reporting
about climate change risks. This issue is important because greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions
measurement and public disclosure to investors can be thought of as a first step towards addressing
climate change issues and reducing the company’s carbon footprint (Reid and Toffel, 2009).

Second, our paper contributes to the corporate governance literature by examining the link between
firm level board diversity and sustainability disclosures in a setting where the disclosure of
information is voluntary but not discretionary (Luo et al., 2012). Prior research examining the
association between board diversity and sustainability disclosures relies on data from, stand-alone
sustainability reports, annual reports and company websites, (Post et al., 2011; Seto-Pamies, 2013
and Fernandez-Feijoo et al., 2014). Thus managers enjoy total discretion over what to report on
environmental issues, (Luo et al. 2012). Whilst firms voluntarily respond to the CDP annual
survey, those that do must answer the same questions in a standard questionnaire. The lack of
comparability between firms when using multiple sources of environmental data is negated
because the CDP data is derived from the same questionnaire, (Luo et al. 2012).

Previous studies examine the relationship between female board participation and general
sustainability (social and environmental) disclosures (Post et al 2011; Seto-Pamies, 2013 and
Fernandez-Feijoo, 2014). However we focus on climate change disclosures because of the
economic significance of global warming related risks and the devastating effects of GHG
emissions on the environment (Luo et al. 2012). Two related studies (Prado-Lorenzo & GarciaSanchez, 2010; Liao et al. 2014) examine the effect of gender diversity on GHG emission
6

disclosures and provide mixed evidence. While Liao et al. (2014) report a positive effect of female
presence on 2010 carbon disclosures in the United Kingdom (UK), Prado-Lorenzo & GarciaSanchez (2010) did not find any effect of gender diversity in the boardroom on GHG disclosures
for a sample of 283 Global companies which answered the CDP questionnaire in 2008. Our work
differs from previous studies with regards to the extended sample from 2008 to 2013 in a climate
of increasing female participation on boards, scope in terms of voluntary climate change disclosure
and proportion of female directors on boards and the critical mass of female directors and
methodology, where endogeneity is accounted for.
We focus on this issue in Canada, a country with minimal requirements regarding gender diversity
in corporate boardrooms and GHG emission levels disclosure. Until 2014, Canadian companies
were not required to disclose the proportion of women on boards and in senior management
positions. Further, under the ‘materiality’ concept, managers enjoy a wide discretion on the
disclosure on climate change related risks (Henderson, 2009). Unlike others such as PradoLorenzo & Garcia-Sanchez (2010) and Liao et al. (2014), we empirically demonstrate the effects
of a critical mass of women directors on voluntary climate change disclosures. Finally, the
aforementioned previous studies did not address endogeneity issues that may result from selfselection bias related to the appointment of women directors to the board (Adams and Ferreira,
2009). Our paper addresses this important issue.

The paper is structured as follows. The next section summarizes prior literature and develops our
research hypotheses. The third section describes our sample and method. The fourth section
presents our results and a conclusion follows.
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2. Related Literature and Research Hypotheses
Global Response to the demands to increase female board participation
The demand to change the composition of corporate boards is global and is driven by the
publication of corporate rankings on board diversity, media attention, calls from stakeholders, legal
or regulatory changes and the development of good corporate governance practices. The global
response has been that countries adopt either a coercive, enabling or laissez-faire approach
(Labelle, Francoeur and Lakhal, 2014) 2 . France, Italy, Norway and Spain have introduced
mandatory quotas for female representation on corporate boards, known as the “feminization” laws
(de Beaufort and Summers, 2013).

Other countries such as Australia, United Kingdom and the United States have relied on a comply
or explain approach to promote female board participation. The Financial Reporting Council
amended the UK Corporate Governance Code which requires listed companies to establish a policy
concerning boardroom diversity in its comply or explain regime. In the UK, “FTSE 100 boards
should aim for a minimum of 25% female representation by 2015 and there is an expectation that
many will achieve a higher figure” 3 . The European Commission has issued a proposal for a
Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council regarding the disclosure of non‐financial
and diversity information by certain large companies and groups. The Commission has set a 40%
target for female representation by 2020. Australia’s ASX Corporate Governance Council made

2

See Labelle et al. (2014) for a comprehensive summary of the different approaches used around the World to
promote female representation on corporate boards.
3
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/182602/bis-13-p135-women-onboards-2013.pdf
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amendments in 2010 to its ASX Corporate Governance Principles and Recommendations4. These
amendments provide a reference point for listed companies with regard to two principles; structure
the board to add value and promote ethical and responsible decision-making. The former
recommends that the nominating committee considers diversity on the board, whilst the latter
recommends that companies establish a policy concerning diversity, disclose the measureable
objectives for achieving gender diversity and disclose in each annual report the proportion of
women in the whole organization, in senior executive positions and on the board. In November
2010, SEC Commissioner Luis A. Aguilar quoted the Alliance for Board Diversity’s report on
diversity in Fortune 100 boards. It stated that the majority of board members, 71.5%, were white
men, and only 28.5% of the board seats were held by women and minorities5. Having sought the
opinions of investors and corporations that controlled over $3 trillion in assets, 90% of whom
supported the disclosure of information on gender and race diversity on corporate board, the SEC
approved rules to enhance such disclosure 6 . The SEC amended Regulation S-K to require
companies to disclose “whether, and if so how, the nominating committee (or the board) considers
diversity in identifying nominees for director”7. The SEC has not however defined diversity.

In contrast, until recently, Canada favoured a voluntary ‘laissez-faire’ approach. Canadian publicly
listed firms were required neither to appoint a minimal number of women directors nor to disclose
the proportion of women on boards and in senior management positions. Two main arguments
have been developed in Canada with regard to female representation on boards, the rights argument

4

http://www.asx.com.au/documents/asx-compliance/cg_principles_recommendations_with_2010_amendments.pdf
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2010/spch110410laa.htm
6
http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2009/2009-268.htm.
5

7

US Securities and Exchange Commission, Release No. 33‐9089, Proxy Disclosure Enhancements (December 16, 2009),
http://www.sec.gov./rules/final/2009/33‐9089.pdf
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and the functionalist argument. The rights argument is embodied in the Employment Equity Act
(S.C. 1995, c. 44) in Canada, similar to legislation throughout the developed world, and seeks “to
achieve equality in the workplace so that no person shall be denied employment opportunities or
benefits for reasons unrelated to ability”8. Moss (2004 p.2) suggests that females ‘rationally use
level of diversity as a proxy for discrimination, since the latter is harder to observe’.

Despite this, numerous studies9 show that the percentage of female directors on Canadian boards
is low by international standards. GMI Ratings’ 2013 survey reveals that the percentage of female
directors on Canadian boards is 13.1%, an increase of less than one percentage point since 2009.
The average tenure of Canadian board members in 2013 was 8.6 years, similar to the US but
substantially less than the UK. This finding, coupled with the slow rate of turnover of directorships
(Canadian boards renewed at a rate of 7% in 2012), may explain the lack of female appointments
to boards (Spizzirri, 2013). These figures are lower than in other developed countries. For instance,
in the US, female participation on Fortune 500 boards was 12.4% in 2001, and after the
introduction of SOX that percentage had increased to 16.1% by 2009, (Dalton and Dalton, 2010).

To address this issue, the Ontario Securities Commission (OSC) introduced recently a ‘Comply or
Explain’ regime to enhance women representation on boards of publicly listed companies. The
new rules, which came into effect on December 31, 2014, are intended to increase transparency
for investors and other stakeholders regarding the representation of women on boards of directors

8

http://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/eng/acts/E-5.401/page-1.html#h-2

9

Catalyst, 2012 Catalyst Census: Financial Post 500 Women Senior Officers and Top Earners (February 19, 2013),
http://www.catalyst.org/knowledge/2012‐catalyst‐census‐financial‐post‐500‐women‐senior‐officers‐and‐top‐earners . GMI
Ratings, GMI Ratings’ 2013 Women on Boards Survey (May 1, 2013), http://www3.gmiratings.com/home/2013/05/gmi‐ratings‐
2013‐women‐on‐boards‐survey. TD Economics, Get On Board Corporate Canada (March 7, 2013),
http://www.td.com/document/PDF/economics/special/GetOnBoardCorporateCanada.pdf
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and in senior executive positions. Companies listed on the Toronto Stock Exchange are required
to report on annual basis, in their proxy circular or annual information form, the number of women
on boards and in senior management positions, and to disclose whether they have established
internal targets for women participation. The new regulation also asks companies to provide
disclosures about their policies to promote board renewal.

Benefits of Female Representation on Boards
Females are able to facilitate more informed decisions and bring different perspectives to boards
compared to all male boards (Daily et al. 2000; Rose, 2007). As the proportion of female
representation on boards increases, females have greater influence on the decision-making
procedure (Elstad and Ladegard, 2010). This is the result of the moral influence on human systems
(Nekhili, and Gatfoui, 2013). Concerns about the ethics of business executives exist especially
when one considers the demise of Enron and Worldcom. A stream of literature examines the
differences in ethical decision-making between male and female executives. Compared to their
male counterparts, female marketing professionals demonstrate higher ethics research judgment
(Akaah, 1989). This finding supports similar findings with regard to higher ethical standards in
female college students compared to male, (Beltramini et al. (1984), and female researchers
compared to male researchers, Ferrell and Skinner (1988). The findings of Bernardi, Bosco and
Columb (2009) suggest that having a higher percentage of women on the board is associated with
being listed as one of the ‘World’s Most Ethical Companies’ if the firms is Fortune 500 company.
Van Staveren (2014) analyzed the Lehman Sisters hypothesis (the claim that if there were more
women at the top, the banking crisis would not have occurred) where the effect of gender
differences on risk aversion, ethics and leadership were discussed. However the lack of significant
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differences in terms of ethical behavior between male and females has also been observed (Kidwell
et al. 1987; Hegarty and Sims, 1978, 1979).

Since the actions of boards are confidential, the empirical literature is restricted to analyzing
publicly available data that reflects the work of boards. In general, this literature examines the
relationship between boards (gender diversity, independent vs. executive directors, governance
rankings etc) and firm performance. With regard to gender diversity on boards and financial
performance, the conclusion is that no consistent and robust relationship has been documented,
(Rhode and Packel, 2010). A related stream of literature examines the relationship between board
diversity and corporate social responsibility (CSR). CSR can be defined as the voluntary activities
a corporation undertakes to operate in an economic, social and environmentally sustainable
manner. Sharma and Henriques (2005) suggest that understanding a firm’s internal drivers may
reveal how corporations develop an understanding of sustainability and how they respond to this
understanding. One such internal driver is board diversity and thus a number of studies explore the
relationship between female representation on boards and CSR. Bear, Rahman and Post (2010)
report that the number of females on the board has a positive relationship with the strength ratings10
for CSR and as the number of females on the board increases so too does the firm’s CSR rating.
Ciorcirlan and Pettersson (2012) suggest that different dimensions of workforce diversity influence
a firm’s commitment to fight climate change. In fact they find that the presence of women tends
to be positively and significantly related to climate change commitment.

10

The authors use the CSR ratings from the KLD database and focus on two social performance strength constructs,
institutional strength ( a positive measure of community and diversity issues) and technical strength (a positive
measure of product, government and employee issues).
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Socialization theory suggests that females have been socialized to be more nurturing,
compassionate, focused on developing interpersonal skills and cooperative, (Skogen, 1999;
Zelezeny et al. 2000).Thus the different characteristics that females bring to boards, a more
participative, democratic and communal leadership style and their ability to facilitate more
informed decisions (Eagley et al. 2003; Eagly and Johnson, 1990: Rudman and Glick, 2001), may
result in improved board effectiveness as a result of the improved quality of board deliberations
and better supervision of the firm’s disclosures, compared to all male boards. It is suggested that
females are more sensitive to corporate social responsibility and environmental issues, Nielsen and
Huse (2010, page 138). For example, although Boulouta (2013) finds that board gender diversity
influences corporate social responsibility, the effect is dependent on the social performance metric
being tested. That is, boards that are more gender diverse affect the negative practices due to more
emphatic caring by female directors. Empirical evidence on the effect of gender diversity on the
dissemination of CSR information from different countries is mixed. For example, using a sample
of multinational firms from 15 countries, Frias-Aceituno et al. (2013) find a positive association
between board gender diversity and integrated reporting. In contrast, Prado-Lorenzo and GarciaSanchez (2010) find that the board of directors continues to concentrate on creating firm value
rather than wider business concepts such as social responsibility. In particular, they report no
significant influence of gender diversity on the dissemination of GHG information for S&P500
firms.

To address the conflicting findings in the studies mentioned above, Ali, Ng and Kulik (2014) test
competing linear and curvilinear models to test the diversity and performance relationship. From
RDT, a positive linear relation is predicted; a negative linear relationship from social identity
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theory while an inverted U-shaped curvilinear is expected from an integration of both theories11.
Ali et al (2014) emphasizes the importance of levels of diversity on performance where in some
performance relations, the relation is non-linear. In addition, the theory chosen also affects the
predicted relationship. As our outcome measure is not performance but rather the likelihood of
voluntary disclosure of GHG emission levels and we focus on gender diversity, we use RDT to
structure our hypothesis. According to Pfeffer and Salancik (1978), RDT asserts that an
organization’s external environment affects its performance where diverse boards are necessary to
fulfil the board’s many functions. For example, the integration of the differing skills and
knowledge of male and female directors are crucial for decision making. Given our focus on the
push to increase female representation on board, our prediction for Canadian firms is for a positive
effect between gender diversity in the boardroom and the likelihood of voluntary disclosure of
GHG emission levels and climate change related strategies.

Hypothesis 1: There is a positive relation between female representation on the board of
directors and the likelihood of voluntary climate change disclosure

Previous studies (Konrad et al. 2008; Torchia et al. 2011; Joecks et al. 2013) argue also that women
representation on boards needs to reach a ‘critical mass’ level before it can affect board members’
decision-making process and firm performance. It is suggested that at least three women on boards
constitutes a critical mass (Konrad et al. 2008). This stream of research relies on Kanter’s (1977a,
b) critical mass theory which predicts that ‘until a certain threshold or critical mass of women in a

11

The results show a positive linear relation between gender diversity and employee productivity, a negative linear
relation between age diversity and ROA and also an inverted (U shaped) curvilinear relationship between age diversity
and ROA.
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group is reached, the focus of the group members is not on the different abilities and skills that
women bring into the group’, Joecks et al. (2013, page 64). Therefore, board gender diversity has
to be significant before it can be acceptable to all board members and enhances strategic decisionmaking (Ben-Amar et al. 2013). Consistent with the critical mass theory, Joecks et al (2013) report
a U shaped relation between gender diversity and performance. At first, women directors have a
negative effect on firm performance but when their presence on board reaches a level of 30%, it
improves firm performance. Torchia et al. (2011) find that a critical mass of women directors (i.e.
three women directors and more) has a positive effect on firm innovation. Post et al. (2011) show
that firms with three and more women directors have better CSR reporting practices. The notion
of a need to reach a critical mass is aligned with social identity theory (Tajfel, 1978) where
individuals identify with others into social groups based on demographics such as gender and age.
When there is a critical mass of one type of demographical attribute, such as gender, female
directors can interact more easily on the board to better its performance (Tuggle et al. 2011;
Richard et al, 2013) .
In this paper, we rely on the critical mass theory to predict that firms with three or more female
directors are more likely to provide climate change disclosures to the CDP.
Hypothesis 2: There is positive relation between a critical mass of three or more women
directors on the board and the likelihood of voluntary climate change
disclosure

3. Research Method
Sample
Our initial sample includes all firms with available corporate governance data in the Canadian
Spencer Stuart Board Index (CSSBI) for the years 2008-2014. Spencer Stuart is one of the World’s
15

largest executive search firms. CSSBI assesses the corporate governance practices of the Top 100
publicly listed firms in Canada with annual revenues exceeding CAD1 billion. We then match the
CSSBI 100 with the 200 firms covered in the CDP-Canada annual survey for the period 20082014. The first CDP questionnaire was sent to the top 200 publicly listed firms (by market
capitalization) on the Toronto Stock Exchange (TSX) in 2006. These firms were asked to
voluntarily complete a standard questionnaire on climate change related risks and opportunities,
GHG emission accounting, carbon performance and governance. We also collect financial data
from the commercial database Stock-Guide. Our initial sample comprises the CSSBI 100 for the
years 2008-2014, 700 firms in total. Of these 700 firms, 134 firms were excluded due to missing
CDP data and 25 due to missing financial data. Thus the final sample includes 541 firm year
observations.
Insert Table 1 here

Research Design and Variables
Table 2 provides a description of our dependent, explanatory and control variables.

Dependent Variable (DISC-DECISION)
Our dependent variable, Disclosure Decision, is a dummy variable that equals one if the firm has
responded to the CDP request for public disclosure of climate change strategies and greenhouse
gas emissions and zero otherwise.
Independent Variable (Board Gender Diversity)

16

We use three proxies of female representation on the board of directors. First we use the percentage
of female directors, calculated as the number of women directors divided by the total number of
directors. We also rely on the Blau (1977) index of heterogeneity as a proxy of board gender
diversity. Miller and Triana (2009, page 766) argue that the Blau index is ‘an ideal measure of
diversity, because it meets the four criteria that have been laid out for a good measure of diversity:
it has a zero point to represent complete homogeneity, larger numbers indicate greater diversity,
the index does not assume negative values and the index is not unbounded’. Further, this index has
been used in prior research (Campbell and Minguez-Vera, 2008; Miller and Triana, 2009; Jockes
et al. 2013) which investigates the effects of board diversity on firm performance. Using Blau

,

index, we measure board gender diversity as H = 1-Ʃki=Ipi2 where I = number of categories (2 for
gender diversity) and pi = the proportion of group members (fraction of female and male directors)
in each category. In the case of gender diversity, Blau index can take values from 0 when there is
only one gender represented on the board to 0.5 when there are equal numbers of female and male
directors in the boardroom. Finally, we also employ a binary variable that equals 1 if three or more
women sit on the board to test the effect of a ‘critical mass’ of women directors on the propensity
to provide climate change disclosures to the CDP.

Control Variables
Our paper controls for the effect of several variables which have been identified in the extant
accounting literature to affect the firm’s voluntary environmental disclosure. We control for other
board attributes such as the percentage of independent directors, leadership structure and the
existence and effectiveness of its standing committees. Prior research (Chen and Jaggi, 2000; Eng
17

and Mak, 2003; Lim et al. 2007; Garcia-Meca and Sanchez-Ballesta, 2010) shows that board
independence affects voluntary disclosure practices. Others including Gul and Leung (2004) and
Cerbioni and Parbonetti (2007) report that the separation of the CEO and board chairperson
positions has a positive effect on disclosure quality. Finally, there is mixed evidence on the impact
of board committees’ attributes on corporate disclosures (Karamanou and Vafeas, 2005; Cerbioni
and Parbonetti, 2007; Laksmana, 2008). We therefore include the number of board’s standing
committees as a control in our multivariate analysis.

We also control for financial variables affecting voluntary disclosure practices. Previous research
show that firm size is positively associated to environmental disclosure quality (Brammer and
Pavelin, 2006; Clarkson et al. 2008; Stanny and Ely, 2008; Freedman and Jaggi, 2011; Luo et al.
2012). We control for firm size measured as the logarithm of total assets. Like prior research
(Brammer and Pavelin, 2006; Stanny and Ely, 2008), we account for the effect of financial
performance, measured by return on assets. Furthermore, we control for investment opportunities
using the market value to book value of equity ratio. Firms with good growth opportunities (higher
market-to-book ratios) should provide more environmental disclosures to reduce the information
asymmetry between the firm and external investors.

Prior environmental disclosure research (Brammer and Pavelin, 2006; Stanny and Ely, 2008) also
control for the effect of financial leverage on disclosure practices. Previous studies (Meek et al.
1995; Brammer and Pavelin, 2006; Stanny and Ely, 2008) suggest that a firm’s industry is a key
determinant of its voluntary disclosure strategy. Firms from carbon intensive industries are subject
18

to higher climate change related risks and therefore we may expect these firms to provide more
information about climate change related strategies than firms from low carbon industries. We
follow the CDP (2008) methodology and define automobile & components, chemicals, forest
products, gas & electrical utilities, oil & gas, mining, pipelines, precious metals, steel &
transportation as high carbon impact industrial sectors.

Insert Table 2 here

We test the following model in our multivariate analysis:
DISC-DECISIONit =α0 + α1 Board Gender Diversityit-1 + α2 Independenceit-1 + α3
CEONOTCOBit-1+ α4 NBCommitteesit-1+ α5 SIZEit-1+ α6 Profitabilityit-1 + α7 Price-to-Bookit-1
+ α8 Leverageit-1 + α9 High-Carbonit + αi YearDummies + i (1)

Board gender diversity is measured by the proportion of women directors, Blau gender diversity
index and binary variables for the number (one, two, three and more) of women directors.
Board gender diversity is likely to be influenced by board attributes (independence, leadership
structure, number of standing committees) and other firm characteristics (firm size and
profitability). Therefore, a regression model that includes gender diversity proxies and other firm
characteristics on the right-hand side of the equation may suffer from endogeneity problems which
may result in biased and inconsistent estimates (Greene, 2003). Previous studies (Campbell and
Minguez-Vera, 2008; Adams and Ferreira, 2009; Srinidhi et al. 2011; Gul et al. 2011) discuss this
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endogeneity issue of self-selection bias related to the firm’s decision to appoint females on boards
and recommend the use of an instrumental variable approach to address it.

We rely therefore on a Probit model with continuous endogenous regressors (IV probit model in
Stata) to address this potential problem. We use the number of directors (board size) and the
existence of a mandatory retirement policy at the board of directors as exogenous instruments to
predict the percentage of women directors. As suggested in Campbell and Minguez-Vera (2008),
we expect board size to have a positive effect on the appointment of women directors. Furthermore,
the existence of a mandatory retirement policy is likely to improve the rate of directorship turnover
and the number of female appointments to boards. Adams and Ferreira (2009) suggest that better
governed firms are more likely to appoint women directors. We therefore also include board
independence, leadership structure (CEO is not the board chairperson) and the number of the
board’s standing committees as instruments to predict female board participation. Following
Campbell and Minguez-Vera (2008), we also include firm size, profitability, leverage and priceto-book, industry and year dummies as instruments to explain board gender diversity.

4. Results
Descriptive statistics
Table 3 provides the distribution of the response rate to the CDP questionnaire by year. On average,
74.3 % of the largest publicly listed firms in Canada accepted the CDP request and provided
information about the potential effects of global warming. In contrast, 25.7% did not answer the
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CDP questionnaire or declined to participate. The average response rate has increased in 2014 and
2013 (78.75% and 76.74% respectively) compared to 2012 (62.9%).
Insert Table 3 here
Table 4 presents descriptive statistics on our sample firms’ board gender diversity, corporate
governance practices as well as other financial characteristics. The board of directors includes on
average 12 directors among whom 80% are independent from management. Women hold on
average 16% of board seats in our sample firms and the average Blau gender diversity score was
0.25. Twenty seven percent of our sample firms have appointed at least three women on their board
of directors.
The position of board chairperson and chief executive officer (CEO) being held by the same person
occurs only in 14% of cases in our sample. On average, boards of directors are structured around
four standing committees which are audit, nomination/governance, compensation/human
resources and environment, health and safety12. Table 4 shows also that on average, 30% of our
sample firms have implemented a mandatory director retirement policy (age limits and/or term
service limits). According to CSSBI (2010), the most common retirement age limit among the
largest 100 Canadian companies in 2010 was 70 years while maximum term limits ranged from
seven to 15 years of consecutive board service. Finally, 47% of our sample firms belong to a high
carbon impact industry.
Insert Table 4 here

12

Other committees include pension/investment, Executive, Risk, Finance, Conduct Review, Social
Responsibility/Public Policy and Strategy/Planning.
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Table 5 shows the correlation analysis. As expected, the decision to disclose is positively
correlated with the percentage of women directors on boards and Blau gender diversity score.
There are also positive and significant correlations between the percentage of independent
directors on boards, separation of CEO and chairperson roles, number of board standing
committees, firm size, profitability and the likelihood of voluntary climate change disclosures to
the CDP. In contrast, firm leverage is negatively correlated. The largest correlation among
explanatory variables involves price-t-book ratio and leverage (corr = 0.33). The relatively low
correlation coefficients among our explanatory variables suggest that multicollinearity may not be
a serious threat in our multivariate analysis.
Insert Table 5 here

Multivariate Analysis
Table 6 presents the results of the Instrumental Variable (IV) Probit model (probit model with
endogenous continuous regressors) regression of disclosure decision dummy on the board gender
diversity and control variables.
Our first hypothesis posits that board gender diversity is positively related to the likelihood of
voluntary climate change disclosure. The results in Table 6 show that the coefficients of the
percentage of women directors (11.57) and Blau diversity index (8.81) are positive and significant
at the 1% level. These results support the predictions of our first hypothesis. Reid and Toffel (2009,
page 1174) suggest that the firm’s public response to the CDP questionnaire ‘requires an
operational commitment to tracking greenhouse gas emissions, a normative commitment to the
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ethics of public disclosure, and an acknowledgment that climate change is an issue that requires
some level of corporate attention’. Therefore, the firm’s public disclosure of GHG emission levels
may be seen as a first step towards addressing climate change issues and reducing of the company’s
carbon footprint. Our results suggest that the increasing presence of women on board enhances the
firm’s awareness about environmental issues and promotes the adoption of proactive strategies to
respond to stakeholder demands for increased public reporting about climate change effects. Our
findings are consistent with previous studies (Bear et al., 2010; Zhang et al., 2013) which report a
positive association between gender diversity in corporate governance and the adoption of CSR
practices at the firm level.
We also find that the number of the board’s standing committees is positively related to voluntary
disclosure of climate change strategies to the CDP. Previous research (Karamanou and Vafeas,
2005; Cerbioni and Parbonetti, 2007; Laksmana, 2008) suggests that board effectiveness will be
contingent on the monitoring activities performed at the level of board committees. Our results
suggest that board effectiveness is enhanced through activities performed at the committee level,
which translate into more transparent disclosure about climate change effects and GHG emissions.
Further, as the number of committees increase, it is more likely that the board will establish a
standing committee on environmental and CSR issues. Such a committee will favor an increased
awareness about the potential effects of climate change related risks on the firm’s competitive
advantage and may implement a proactive strategy to address them.
Among the remaining control variables, leverage and high carbon industry membership have a
significant effect on voluntary climate change disclosures. Firms from high carbon impact
industries are more likely to respond to institutional investors’ requests for public reporting about
climate change risks. We also find that leverage is negatively related to voluntary disclosure of
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climate change strategies. When we take into account endogeneity issues, it seems that firm size,
profitability and growth opportunities have no significant impact on the firm’s decision to respond
to the CDP questionnaire. Finally, based on the results of the Wald test, we cannot reject the null
hypothesis that there is no endogeneity in our model.
The results of the first stage regressions show that board gender diversity is explained by firmlevel governance attributes, firm size as well as industry patterns. Both models show that the
separation of the CEO and board chairperson roles is positively related to the proportion of female
representation on boards. Firm size has also a positive effect on the appointment of women
directors. Finally, we can also see that women are less likely to serve on the boards of firms from
high carbon impact industries such as energy and materials.
Insert Table 6 here
Our second hypothesis predicts that a board needs to reach a critical mass of women directors to
have a positive effect on voluntary disclosures of climate change related risks. Following Torchia
et al. (2011), we introduce three binary variables (onewoman, twowomen,threemorewomen) to
test this hypothesis. The first binary variable takes the value of one if there is only one woman
director and zero otherwise. The second takes the value of 1 when two women sit on boards. The
third binary variable takes the value of one when there is at least three women directors on board
and zero otherwise. By doing so, we can interpret the coefficient of each dummy variables relative
to the baseline (all male boards). The results of the test of the critical mass hypothesis are presented
in Table 7.
The coefficient of the onewoman binary variable is positive but not statistically significant. This
results suggest that when there only one woman in a male dominated board, she may be perceived
24

as a ‘token’ in the group and is less likely to affect the decision making process at the board level.
The coefficients of the two other dummy variables (twowomen and threemorewomen) are positive
and significant. This result is consistent with prior studies, (Konrad et al. 2008; Post et al. 2011)
and supports the critical mass prediction. Unless boards have a critical mass of two female directors
in our sample, the effect of women on the decision making process is limited. When this critical
mass is reached, female presence has a positive impact on corporate response to stakeholders’
demands to provide public disclosures about climate change related risks and strategies. Combined
with the results of Table 6, our findings indicate that until there are two women directors on the
board, gender diversity has no impact on climate change disclosure practices. Beyond this
threshold, increased levels of female board participation have a positive impact on the likelihood
to voluntarily provide disclosures to the CDP about GHG emission levels and climate change
strategies.
Following Joecks et al. (2013) we also explored whether the relation between board gender
diversity and voluntary climate change disclosure is U shaped. We ran regressions of climate
change disclosure dummy on board gender diversity including a quadratic term (squared values of
women percentage and Blau diversity index). We did not find any nonlinear relation between
gender diversity proxies and climate change disclosures. These results are not tabulated for brevity.
Insert Table 7 here

Conclusion
This paper examines the potential impact of female representation on the board of directors on
corporate response to stakeholder demands for increased public reporting about climate change
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related risks. We rely on the Carbon disclosure Project (CDP) as a sustainability initiative
supported by an influential group of stakeholders (i.e. institutional investors). Greenhouse Gas
(GHG) emissions measurement and its public disclosure to investors can be thought of as a first
step towards addressing climate change issues and reducing a company’s carbon footprint. Given
the board of directors has a fiduciary duty to manage material risks to the firm, we examine the
influence of board gender diversity on the firm’s decision to respond voluntarily to the CDP annual
questionnaire. We measure board gender diversity through the proportion of women directors and
the Blau (1977) index of heterogeneity.

Based on sample of Canadian firm over the period 2008-2011, we find that female boardroom
participation is positively related to the voluntary disclosure of climate change information, after
board attributes and firm factors are taken into consideration. This result suggests that gender
diversity enhances board effectiveness in stakeholder management and promotes the adoption of
sustainability initiatives. Our results support recent research showing a positive effect of board
gender diversity on the adoption of CSR practices (Bear et al. 2010; Zhang et al. 2013) and
financial reporting quality (Gul et al. 2011; Srinidhi et al. 2011). We find also that board gender
diversity needs to reach a critical mass of two women directors before it starts influencing board
disclosures on GHG emission levels and climate change strategies. Our results are robust to
potential endogeneity issues.

From a public policy perspective, our results are of interest to policymakers. Our findings are
consistent with the different initiatives being undertaken in many countries around the world to
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promote gender diversity in corporate governance. Until 2014, there was no guideline in Canada
regarding female representation on boards or in senior management positions. Further, Canadian
listed companies were not required to disclose neither the proportion of women directors nor their
gender diversity policies (OSC, 2013). Recently, the OSC introduced a ‘Comply or Explain’
approach with regard to women representation on boards of Canadian publicly listed firms. Our
findings support the recent changes introduced by the OSC aiming to increase female participation
on boards and in senior management positions. We show that women directors enhance corporate
disclosure transparency with regards to climate change related risks.

However, these new requirements were also criticized by influential stakeholders as being
insufficient to promote female presence on boards and ultimately board effectiveness. For instance,
the Ontario Teachers’ Pension Plan (OTPP), a global investor with $130 billion of net assets,
believes that the Canadian “comply or explain” approach to corporate governance and gender
diversity in the boardroom does not work as planned. Instead, OTPP13 suggests a minimum of
three women directors be appointed to boards of TSX listed firms. Our results on the critical mass
theory support partially the OTPP position. Unless Canadian boardrooms include a critical mass
of two women directors, gender diversity is unlikely to enhance board strategic decisions.

13

http://iveybusinessjournal.com/topics/governance/forcing-gender-diversity-on-canadian-boards
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Table 1
Sample Composition
Final Sample by Year

CSSBI
No CDP data
No Financial Data
Final Sample

2008
100
20
8
72

2009
100
22
4
74

2010
100
27
4
69

2011
100
14
7
79

2012
100
17
2
81

2013
100
14

2014
100
20

86

80

Description
Dependent Variable
Dummy variable that equals one if the firm
answered the CDP questionnaire (AQ=1)
and zero otherwise.
Board Gender Diversity Variables
Number of women seating on the board of
directors

Source

Total
700
134
25
541

Table 2
Variable Description

Variable
DISC-DECISION

NB-WOMEN

CDP Reports

Spencer Stuart
Canadian Board
index
Spencer Stuart
Canadian Board
index
Spencer Stuart
Canadian Board
index

PERCENT-WOMEN

Percentage of women on the board of
directors

BLAU-INDEX

Blau (1977) index of heterogeneity. H = 1Ʃki=Ipi2, where I = number of categories (2
for gender diversity) and pi = the
proportion of group members (fraction of
female and male directors) in each
category.

3WOMEN

Dummy variable that equals 1 if there at Spencer Stuart
least 3 women seating on the board of Canadian Board
directors and zero otherwise
index
Control Variables
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INDEPENDENCE

Percentage of independent directors on the Spencer Stuart
board
Canadian Board
index

CEONOTCOB

Dummy variable that equals 1 if the CEO Spencer Stuart
is not the board chairperson and zero Canadian Board
otherwise
index

NBCOMMITTEES

Number of board standing committees

Spencer Stuart
Canadian Board
index

SIZE
PROFITABILITY
PRICE-TO-BOOK

Firm size (Logarithm of total assets)
Return on assets
Price to book value of equity

Stock-Guide
Stock-Guide
Stock-Guide

LEVERAGE
HIGH-CARBON

Debt-to-equity ratio
Stock-Guide
Dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm CDP Reports
belongs to a high carbon impact industrial
sector. High-carbon impact industries
include Automobiles & components,
Chemicals, Forest products, Gas &
Electrical Utilities, Oil & gas, Mining,
Pipelines, Precious Metals, Steel and
Transportation.
Instruments

BOARDSIZE

MANDATORYRET

Total number of directors

Spencer Stuart
Canadian Board
index
Dummy variable that equals 1 if the board Spencer Stuart
has a mandatory retirement policy for Board index
directors and zero otherwise.
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Table 3
Response Rate by Year
Total

2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014

72
74
69
79
81
86
80
541

Number (%) of firms that Number (%) of firms
answered the CDP questionnaire that did not answer the
CDP questionnaire
54 (75%)
18 (25%)
55 (74.32%)
19 (25.68%)
51 (73.91%)
18 (26.09%)
62 (78.48%)
17 (21.52%)
51 (62.96%)
30 (37.04%)
66 (76.74%)
20 (23.26%)
63 (78.75%)
17 (21.25%)
402 (74.30%)
141 (25.70%)
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Table 4
Descriptive statistics
This table presents descriptive statistics. See Table 1 for variable definition. The sample includes 294
firm-year observations for publicly listed companies with available corporate governance data in the
CSSBI over the period 2008-2011.

Variable

N

DISC-DECISION
NB-WOMEN
PERCENT-WOMEN
BLAU-INDEX
OneWoman
TwoWomen
ThreeWomenMore

Minimum

Maximum

DEPENDENT VARIABLE
541
0.74
1
0.43

0

1

BOARD GENDER DIVERSITY VARIABLES
541
1.95
2.00
1.20

0

6

0

0.57

0
0
0
0

0.49
1
1
1

541

Mean

0.16

Median

0.15

Std-dev

0.09

541
0.25
0.26
0.11
541
0.29
0.46
541
0.34
0.47
541
0.27
0.44
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE VARIABLES

BOARDSIZE

541

11.86

12

2.76

6

21

INDEPENDENCE

541

0.80

0.83

0.12

0.28

1

CEONOCOB

541

0.86

0.34

0

1

NBCOMMITTEES

541

4.04

1.05

2

7

MANDATORYRET

541

0.30

0.46

0

1

6.82

20.40

SIZE

4

OTHER CONTROL VARIABLES
541 13.25
14.62
3.73

PROFITABILITY (%)

541

3.45

2.99

8.27

-117.5

45.62

PRICETOBOOK

541

2.19

2.57

1.66

0

23.97

LEVERAGE

541

0.82

0.50

0.89

0

7.07

HIGHCARBON

541

0.47

0.50

0

1
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Table 5
Correlation Matrix
This table presents pairwise correlations among dependent, independent and control variables. See Table 1 for variable definition. The sample
includes 541 firm-year observations for publicly listed companies with available corporate governance data in the CSSBI over the period 20082014. * denotes significance at the 5% level
1
1-DISC-DECISION
2-PERCENTWOMEN
3- BLAU INDEX
4. INDEPENDENCE
5. CEONOTCOB
6. NBCOMMITTEES
7. SIZE
8. PROFITABILITY
9. PRICETOBOOK
10. LEVERAGE
11. HIGHCARBON

1
0.23 *
0.25*
0.25*
0.21*
0.10*
0.03
-0.01
-0.18 *

2

3

4

5

1
0.97*
0.15*
0.25*
-0.06
-0.01
0.02
0.13*
0.10*
-0.18*

1
0.17*
0.28*
-0.03
0.01
0.01
0.12*
0.11*
-0.18*

1
0.16*
0.13*
0.01
-0.05
-0.03
-0.01
0.05

1
0.12*
0.04
-0.01
0.01
-0.05

6

7

8

9

10

11

1
0.13*
-0.05
-0.01
-0.10*
0.31*

1
-0.11*
-0.07
0.03
-0.06

1
0.14*
-0.12*
-0.01

1
0.33*
-0.03

1
-0.06-

1
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Table 6
Board Gender Diversity and Carbon Disclosure Decision
This table presents the results of an Instrumental Variable Probit regression of Carbon Disclosure Decision
on board gender diversity and control Variables. See Table 1 for variable definition. The sample includes
294 firm-year observations for publicly listed companies with available corporate governance data in the
CSSBI over the period 2008-2014. Heteroskedasticity adjusted (White, 1980) standard errors are used to
compute z-statistics. *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively
First Stage

Second Stage

First Stage

Second Stage

Percent Women
Coefficient
(z-statistic)

Disclosure Decision
Coefficient
(z-statistic)
11.57***
(4.64)

Blau Index
Coefficient
(z-statistic)

Disclosure Decision
Coefficient
(z-statistic)

PERCENTWOMEN
BLAU INDEX
CONTROL VARIABLES
INDEPENDENCE
CEONOTCOB
NBCOMMITTEES
FIRM SIZE
PROFITABILITY
PRICETOBOOK
LEVERAGE
HIGHCARBON
BOARD SIZE
MANDATORYRET
INTERCEPT
Year Dummies
Nb. observations
Wald Chi 2

Wald Test of Exogeneity:

8.81 ***
(4.95)
0.05
(0.76)
0.06 ***
(3.15)
-0.01
(-1.35)
0.01 *
(1.89)
0.00
(0.75)
0.01
(1.42)
0.00
(0.39)
-0.02 *
(-1.69)
0.00
(0.36)
0.02
(1.23)
-0.10
(-1.31)
Yes
541

0.53
(0.34)
-0.26
(-0.45)
0.16 **
(2.18)
0.01
(0.05)
0.00
(0.08)
-0.03
(-0.62)
-0.25
(-1.54)
0.34 *
(1.85)

Yes
541
269.70***

Chi2(1): 1.64;
Prob>chi2=0.20

0.07
(0.90)
0.09 ***
(3.00)
-0.01
(-1.06)
0.012 *
(1.86)
0.00
(0.49)
0.01
(1.36)
0.01
(0.55)
-0.034 *
(-1.67)
0.001
(0.57)
0.03
(1.46)
-0.12
(-1.35)
Yes
541

0.64
(0.45)
-0.29
(-0.53)
0.15 *
(1.88)
0.01
(0.09)
0.00
(0.32)
-0.02
(-0.51)
-0.28 **
(-2.08)
0.34 *
(1.80)

Yes
541
257.62***

Chi2(1):2.15 ;
Prob>chi2=0.143
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Table 7
Critical Mass of Women Directors and Carbon Disclosure Decision
This table presents the results of a Probit regression of Carbon Disclosure Decision on three women
director dummy and control Variables. See Table 1 for variable definition. The sample includes 294 firmyear observations for publicly listed companies with available corporate governance data in the CSSBI
over the period 2008-2011. Heteroskedasticity adjusted (White, 1980) standard errors are used to compute
z-statistics. *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively
Model 1
DISC-DECISION
Coefficient

Z-stat

ONEWoman

0.19

0.48

TWOWomen

0.69

1.69 *

3WOMENMORE

1.14

2.49 **

INDEPENDENCE

2.03

2.23 **

CEONOTCOB

0.38

1.04

NBCOMMITTEES

0.15

1.17

FIRM SIZE

0.20

2.20 **

PROFITABILITY

0.015

1.48

PRICETOBOOK

-0.02

-0.27

LEVERAGE

-0.32

-2.12 **

HIGHCARBON

0.46

1.68 *

INTERCEPT

-5.45

-3.49 ***

YEAR DUMMIES

Yes

Nb. observations

541

Wald Chi 2

55.11 ***

Pseudo-R2

24.80 %
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